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Abstract 
 
I examine the changes in firm value that oil, natural gas, and mining firms experience 
as a result of the implementation of the Cardin-Lugar Amendment into U.S. law. 
Using the traditional event study methodology I observe abnormal stock returns of 
U.S. listed extractive firms over five key events of the passage the regulation. The 
empirical evidence suggests that stock markets respond negatively to increased 
disclosure requirements for oil and gas producers, suggesting that the regulation 
harms the investors. In contrast the results suggest that the mining industry is in 
general unaffected by the Cardin-Lugar Amendment.   
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1. Introduction  
In recent years various regulatory authorities have pushed for increased disclosure 
requirements for extractive industries. The trend originated in the United States in 
connection with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), and has since then followed in the European Union, 
United Kingdom, Canada, Norway and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEC, 2015). 
The purpose of the regulations is to mitigate corruption and to increase the 
accountability of governments of resource rich countries (SEC, 2010; EITI, 2016). 
The issue of these regulations is that they have been pushed and implemented without 
knowing what effects they have on corruption in the country in question or what 
effect they have on the economy of the implementing country. This paper addresses 
the latter issue by providing empirical evidence on the economic consequences 
extractive firms experience by publicly disclosing payments made to governments. 
This knowledge contributes to the field of securities regulation for future anti-
corruption regulation.  
 
Increasing disclosure requirements of extractive firms can have a negative net effect. 
The main intent of the Dodd-Frank Act is to increase the stability of the financial 
system as a response to the financial crisis of 2008 (The Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). 
However, it includes some sections that expand the scope of the Act. In the Dodd-
Frank Act’s final draft, Section 1504 Disclosure of payments by resource extraction 
issuers is included, which is a U.S. legal measure to mitigate corruption in countries 
where U.S. listed natural resource extraction issuers operates (The Dodd-Frank Act, 
2010). In the arena of anti-corruption measures we do not know what affects foreign 
disclosure requirements will have on companies and accordingly we do not know if it 
is a sound measure in order to mitigate corruption. If the legislation harms the 
implementing country’s economy, it might not be considered an effective method. A 
financial regulation such as Section 1504 could result in U.S. listed companies 
retracting from the resource rich countries only to be replaced by companies that still 
do not have to disclose payments to governments. This results in a total negative 
effect as the citizens of the resource rich countries experience an economic status quo 
(or decline) and the country that implements the rule experiences an economic 
decrease. 
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It has been observed that some countries that are rich in natural resources still have 
poor economies and average low standards of living, a phenomenon known as the 
resource curse (Auty, 1993). The resource curse is a phenomenon involving several 
factors and this study relates to corruption as a part of that phenomenon. Resource 
rich countries are especially exposed to the costs of corruption where money is 
diverted from public services such as infrastructure and education to impersonal 
money flows. It increases the cost of capital of bribe-paying firms (Kaufmann and 
Wei, 1999), puts honest businesses in a competitive disadvantage, distorts markets, 
and prices of government contracts (International Chamber of Commerce, et al., 
2008). Economic development is highly dependent on trust, and corruption leads to a 
loss of trust (Shaxson, 2007). Corruption is a systemic matter rather than a matter of 
particular actors and their behavior, and it is a global matter with emphasis on 
international financial flows. A systemic approach to increase trust is through 
increased transparency through legislation such as the FCPA and Section 1504. 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act includes Section 1504, which requires natural resource 
extraction issuers to publicly disclose payments made to foreign governments or the 
Federal Government (The Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). The Section is also known as the 
Cardin-Lugar Amendment and is an extension of the FCPA and a domestic 
implementation of the EITI. The FCPA, implemented in the U.S in 1977, made it 
illegal for certain classes of persons and entities to bribe foreign government officials 
in order to obtain or retain business. The act was enacted because corporate bribery 
had damaged the image of U.S. businesses and hindered the efficient functioning of 
markets (FCPA, 2012). The EITI was an initiative that launched in 2003 to promote 
global open and accountable management of natural resources, increasing 
transparency and accountability of governments and enterprises. The main goal of the 
increased transparency is to give the citizens of the resource rich countries more 
power to hold their governments accountable for the wealth that the resources are 
generating (SEC, 2012). 
 
The Cardin-Lugar Amendment is still in the process of being implemented by the 
SEC after first being implemented and later vacated as a result of a lawsuit filed by 
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the American Petroleum Institute, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National 
Foreign Trade Council, and the Independent Petroleum Association of America, 
hereafter referred as “API et al.” (Congressional Research Service, 2015). The SEC 
was sued on several grounds, the major stating that it would put the affected issuers in 
a competitive disadvantage against competing businesses by requiring the reports to 
be made publicly available. Moreover, they claimed that the SEC had not done an 
acceptable cost-benefit analysis and thus failed to consider the public interest 
properly. Lastly, the suit addressed the rule to exempt countries that forbid payment 
disclosures, namely Angola, Cameroon, China, and Qatar (Congressional Research 
Service, 2015). The SEC has re-drafted the rule that got vacated in 2013 and issued a 
new proposal on December 11, 2015 (SEC, 2015). The rule has not yet been admitted 
(2016-05-24). 
 
The literature on financial regulation is extensive and it reaches from research on the 
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. However, 
studies on the markets’ reactions on the Dodd-Frank Act is limited, as of March 2016 
existing of only one accepted paper, according to knowledge of Gao, Liao and Wang 
(2016). Previous research on disclosure requirements’ economic impact on firm value 
is also limited, consisting of one short paper by Johannesen and Larsen (2016). In 
addition to Gao et al. (2016) a student paper examines the markets’ reaction on 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act authored by Bronstein (2015). 
 
The paper by Gao et al. (2016) serves as a foundation for this study. In their study 
they examine the markets’ reaction to the Dodd-Frank Act. The focus of the study of 
Gao et al. (2016) is the markets’ expectation of the effectiveness of the central intent 
of the Dodd-Frank Act. That is to reform and increase the safety of the financial 
system, in order to restore confidence in the financial market. In order to observe if 
any abnormal stock and bond returns are present the authors conduct event studies 
over 16 event dates to evaluate the markets’ reactions.  
 
Johannesen and Larsen (2016) measure what effects a European legislation that 
requires firms in the extractive industry to report country-by-country tax payments 
has on oil, gas, and mining companies. The Development Committee of the European 
Parliament published in 2010 a proposal of country-by-country reporting of tax 
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payments of extractive industries to be integrated into the international financial 
reporting standards. It is not the same as the Dodd-Frank but it is an antecedent to 
preciously mentioned Directive/34/EU and thus has relevant substance for this study. 
In their study they conduct event studies over 4 event dates to observe any abnormal 
returns. 
 
Johannesen and Larsen (2016) find overall negative abnormal returns cumulated over 
the legislation process. Their evidence suggests that tax evasion has been profitable 
and that the disclosure requirement is an effective measure to address tax evasion.  
 
A student paper by Bronstein (2015) serves as an inspiration for the topic of this 
study. Bronstein conducts an event study to measure if the implementation of Section 
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires mineral companies to disclose the origin 
of their minerals, has an economic impact on mineral companies. This study 
compliments Bronstein by observing the economic impact of Section 1504 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  
 
This study aims to increase the understanding of the economic consequences 
disclosing requirements have on extractive firms and I set out provide that knowledge 
by answering the following research question: 
 
What affect does the passage of Section 1504 have on the firm value of U.S. listed 
extractive firms?  
 
In order to observe any economic consequences I conduct an event study over five 
key event dates with a three-day event window to provide empirical evidence if 
events associated with the passage of the Cardin-Lugar Amendment result in 
abnormal stock returns for the extractive industries.  
 
I find some evidence that the oil and gas industry experience negative cumulated 
abnormal stock returns in response to events that are for the passage of Section 1504 
and positive cumulated abnormal returns in response to events that are against. These 
findings are however not consistent over all events. Regarding the mining industry 
only one event led to abnormal returns that were significantly different from zero, 
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suggesting the firm value of mining firms is unaffected by the Cardin-Lugar 
Amendment.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature of securities regulation as well as the resource 
curse by adding knowledge to the fields that the firm value of U.S. listed oil and gas 
firms decreases to increased oil, natural gas and mining disclosure requirements. 
Increasing transparency as a measure of mitigating the resource seems to have 
negative consequences that have to be considered in future policymaking.  
 
The continuing structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section I present the 
literature underlying this study. I present the methodology of the study and hypothesis 
in section 3. In section 4, I present the data collection process. Section 5 presents the 
results and an analysis of the results. A discussion of the study follows in section 6. 
Lastly I finish with conclusions in section 7.   
2. Literature 
The literature I present in this section explains firms’ attitudes towards disclosure 
requirements in general, specific discussions regarding Section 1504, market behavior 
regarding regulation processes, and empirical findings of similar cases. I use this 
literature to provide a general understanding, with in-depth discussions, and empirical 
evidence to be able answer how the markets behave in regards to the Cardin-Lugar 
Amendment. 
 
2.1 Firms’ Attitudes Towards Disclosure Requirements  
In theory, companies should strive for firm disclosure requirements, however, 
voluntary disclosure is a rare occurrence (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000). Firms should 
strive for increased disclosure because strict disclosure requirements lead to improved 
liquidity and efficient markets in financial securities, and reduce cost of capital for 
firms through greater investor confidence. In addition, not disclosing information is 
regarded as an action and is to be taken as bad news. Inconsistent with this logic, 
firms in general do not voluntarily disclose information (Admati and Pfleiderer, 
2000). Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms 
and the desirability of disclosure regulation. Specifically they try to explain the 
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appropriate required level of disclosure, and I use the presented underlying 
assumptions and discussions from their study.  
 
Firms do not voluntarily disclose information because it is costly. First, it is costly for 
firms to gather and process the information that is to be disclosed, especially if it 
needs to be confirmed by a third party, such as an accounting firm. Secondly, by 
disclosing information a firm provides important knowledge to competing businesses 
and other parties so that the firm could lose competitive advantages and bargaining 
power. Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) bring up Fishman and Hagerty (1998) that show 
that even if voluntary disclosure is costly, firms do not desire disclosure requirements. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) present three basic assumptions: 
 
(i) firms’ values are correlated and the disclosures made by one firm 
are used by investors in valuing other firms; 
(ii) disclosure of information is costly, and this cost increases in the 
precision of the disclosed information; 
(iii) Information asymmetries between firms and investors reduce firm 
value 
 
Assumption (iii) is further built on the assumption that a decrease in information 
asymmetries increases the chances of the firm being bought by someone who values it 
more than it current holders. Value reductions are thus derived from underinvestment 
and costs connected with illiquidity. This implies that steps towards increased 
disclosure requirement to some extent increase firm value.  
 
Berns (2011) discusses in his paper what costs that will arise with an implementation 
of Section 1504. He does so by discussing concerns raised by the oil and gas industry 
and analyzes the top 50 international oil and gas companies and their stock exchange 
participation (share of stock listed on stock markets), to decide the coverage of the 
regulation. Berns (2011) argues that Section 1504 fails to exhaustively cover listed 
extractive firms, which will result in competitive disadvantages to companies covered 
by the Section compared to firms that are not affected by the regulation. This change 
in competitiveness is likely to harm investors (Berns, 2011).  
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In addition to the costs raised by Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), Berns (2011) add that 
firms will suffer external public relations costs from disclosing payments to foreign 
governments publicly, and costs related to forced violation or costly renegotiation of 
existing contracts between companies and foreign governments. Securities law 
experts argue that that Section 1504 is a low-cost regulation and that it is an inevitable 
addition to a series of efforts of international disclosure standards. Berns (2011) 
answers that by stating that they overlook the competitive disadvantage affected firms 
will face. Berns (2011) argues that an implementation of the rules of the SEC 
proposed in 2010 will result in costs that are high enough for foreign firms to delist 
from U.S. stock markets. To further strengthen his argument he raises statements from 
industry participators that they might be forced to leave the U.S. market to protect 
their investors.  U.S. listed companies will experience an increased disadvantage as 
more companies delist because there will be more unregulated firms that competes for 
the same contracts, potentially harming the U.S. economy even more (Berns, 2011).  
 
2.2 Related Research on Disclosure Requirements for the Extractive Industry 
Gao et al., Liao and Wang (2016) authored the first accepted paper regarding the 
markets’ reactions to the Dodd-Frank Act. In their study they examine the markets’ 
reaction to the Dodd-Frank Act, and what economic impact the Act has on 
systemically important financial firms. Gao et al. (2016) evaluate the markets’ 
expectations of the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act in two regards, the intended 
reduction of risk-taking by banks, and the elimination of too-big-to-fail (TBTF). They 
also assess financial institutions’ contribution to systemic risk surrounding the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
 
The article of Gao et al. (2016) is important for this study mainly because of its 
framework. Their empirical findings give small or no indication of what can be 
expected in this study, because different industries, events and legal implications are 
studied. They study how financial institutions, react to regulation for decreased risk-
taking and TBTF, over events leading up to and including when the Dodd-Frank Act 
passed Congress (Gao et al., 2016). Still, Gao et al. (2016) present three main 
assumptions that are relevant for this study. Firstly, they explain the markets’ reaction 
to regulatory events as a combination of the costs/benefits of the proposed rules and 
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the likelihood of passage. Secondly, they assume that the likelihood of passage 
increases after each event. Thirdly, an event is interpreted as lobbyists successfully 
compromising the legislation when a positive market stock reaction is found. The 
final draft of the Dodd-Frank Act is considered a compromise of politicians and 
lobbyists from the banking industry who work to mitigate the restrictions of the law 
(Gao et al., 2016). Data regarding lobbyists against Section 1504 has not been found, 
however five senators wrote a letter to the SEC urging the Commission to resist 
pressure by the oil industry to weaken the Dodd-Frank rule indicating that such 
pressure exists (Publish What You Pay, 2015). Additionally, the methodology used by 
Gao et al. (2016) is used in this study and is presented in the methodology section. 
 
Johannesen and Larsen (2016) conduct an event study on the European Union’s 
disclosure requirements on listed oil, gas and mining companies to report country-by-
country tax payments. The empirical evidence presented suggests that disclosure 
requirements for the European listed extractive firms are associated with decreases in 
firm value with negative abnormal returns between 5 and 10 percent cumulated over 
the four studied events. Their findings give an indication of firms’ attitudes towards 
increased transparency. According to the authors, the European rule has its origin to 
prevent tax evasion and by that the assumed explanations for eventual abnormal 
returns differ from the ones in this study. However, the requirements of the rules are 
quite similar, where both require listed oil, gas, and mining firms, to disclose 
payments made to governments, by country and by project. Therefore, the market 
reaction of the U.S. regulation is expected to be similar. 
 
2.3 Inferences  
Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) and Berns (2011) discuss that firms in general disfavor 
increased disclosure requirements because it is costly in multiple ways. Increased 
disclosure requirements increase costs directly as well as indirectly, by requiring the 
firms to acquire the necessary information and through lost opportunities as result of 
exposing strategically important information to competitors (Admati and Pfleiderer, 
2000; Berns, 2011). Gao et al. (2016) add assumptions how the market will react, and 
Johannesen and Larsen (2016) present empirical evidence that the European market 
reacts negatively to increased disclosure requirements for extractive firms. 
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Based on the above presented literature, I hypothesize that observed firms will 
experience negative abnormal returns on events in favor of increased disclosure 
requirements (for the policy) and positive abnormal returns on events against 
increased disclosure requirements (against the policy). 
3. Methodology  
In order to measure the true effect an event will have on a firm or industry it is 
necessary to observe both short-term as well as long-term effects. It requires a lot of 
time and special data to observe different impacts, such as direct productivity related 
measures (MacKinlay, 1997).  
 
A good way of measuring the economic impact of an event within a short period of 
time is to conduct an event study. A fundamental assumption for using the method is 
that the markets are efficient (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), which implies that the 
stock prices are reflecting all relevant information that is available to the market. As 
new relevant information is introduced to the market the stock prices will be affected 
as the information is incorporated in the stock prices instantaneously.  
 
The event study methodology is a common practice within the fields of finance and 
economics, with more than 500 published event studies (Kothari, Warner, 2006).   
This study will use the presented Market Model, which is the most used model for 
event studies because it uses easily accessible data and the gains of using more 
complicated models are limited (MacKinlay, 1997). 
 
3.1 The Event Study Methodology 
The first step of the event study is to define the event that is to be observed and to 
identify over which period of time the security prices of the relevant firms will be 
observed. The event period is the period where the impact of the event is studied and 
is commonly defined as a longer period than the specified event date (MacKinlay, 
1997). The event dates for this study are presented in the data segment. I use a three-
day event window with day 0 as the event date,  ± 1 day. It is possible for information 
to reach the market before it is announced in media and I expand the event window -1 
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day to increase the possibility of catching the event (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). I 
expand the event window +1 day to catch price effects of the information after the 
stock market closes on the announcement day (MacKinlay, 1997). Expanding the 
event window comes at a cost I restrict the event window to three days as a large 
event window decreases the power of the test statistic and it increases the risk of 
including confounding events (Brown and Warner, 1985; McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997). Short event windows will usually capture the significant effect of an event 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). 
 
An important issue raised by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) is to correctly specify an 
event date. An event date is specified as an unanticipated event when new information 
is available to the market (MacKinlay, 1997). If the exact event date is anticipated the 
event is misspecified because prices will already incorporate the anticipated event 
outcome (MacKinlay, 1997). When observing regulatory changes it is of great 
importance to choose the date carefully, as regulatory changes often are in the 
political debate for long periods of time and it can be difficult to identify when new 
information actually is revealed (MacKinlay, 1997). If an event is misspecified one 
risk to draw conclusions from a supposed event that actually did not occur, which 
leads to incorrect results.  
 
The second step for an event study is that the assessment of the impact of an event 
requires a measure of the abnormal return. The method used to identify abnormal 
returns is explained in the following segments. For firm i and the event date t the 
abnormal return is  
  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡)    (1)  
 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the abnormal return, 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the actual return and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡)  is the 
normal return respectively for the time period t. 𝑋𝑡 is the conditioning information for 
the normal return model, of which there are two method choices to determine. Either 
the constant mean return model where 𝑋𝑡 is a constant, or the market model where 𝑋𝑡 
is the market return. The choice of model depends if the return is assumed to follow a 
constant mean or have a linear relation between market return and security return. I 
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make the assumption that the extraction industry returns follow a linear relation 
according to the market model and will in this study follow that model. The market 
model for a security i is 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    (2) 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 0), 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖𝑡) =  𝜎𝜀
2 
 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 are the period t returns on security i and the market portfolio, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is the zero mean disturbance term. 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖, and 𝜎𝜀
2 are the parameters of the market 
model. The market portfolio in this study is chosen to be the S&P 500 Index and the 
parameters are estimated using OLS regressing the data from the estimation window 
of 120 trading days prior the event date, spanning over a time period of over five 
months (MacKinlay, 1997). The complete time line of the study will indexed τ where 
τ = 0 is the event date, τ = 𝑇0 + 1 to τ = 𝑇1 is the estimation window and τ = 𝑇1 + 1 to 
τ = 𝑇2  is the event window. A visual illustration of an event study time line is 
presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Time line for an event study. 
 
           Estimation Window       Event Window 
     
           𝑇0       𝑇1      𝜏 = 0        𝑇2 
 
 
Below I present a series of equations that are necessary to be able to calculate the 
sample estimated cumulative abnormal return 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and the test statistic 𝜃 . After 
estimating ?̂?  and ?̂?  I calculate the estimated variance that is used to calculate the 
variance of CAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
?̂?2 =  
1
𝑇1− 𝑇0−2
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝜏 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝜏)
2𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+ 1
   (3) 
 
Using the market model to calculate the normal returns, I can estimate the sample 
abnormal returns using the given parameters as 
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𝐴?̂?𝑖𝜏 =  𝑅𝑖𝜏 − ?̂?𝑖 −  ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝜏     (4) 
 
This study examines data over two dimensions, both through time and across 
securities, which makes it necessary to aggregate the effects in order to draw any 
overall conclusions for the respective event. Studying an individual security I 
calculate the estimated cumulative abnormal return (𝐶𝐴?̂?) as the sum of the abnormal 
returns of the security over the event window,  
 
𝐶𝐴?̂?i(τ1, τ2) =  ∑ 𝐴?̂?iτ
τ2
τ= τ1
     (5) 
 
The variance of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖  𝑖𝑠 used to calculate the test statistic and is calculated as 
 
𝜎𝑖
2(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = (𝜏2 − 𝜏1 + 1)𝜎𝜀𝑖
2      (6) 
 
Calculating the CAR’s from (5) for each security I can calculate the average estimated 
cumulative abnormal return of all securities, 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1, 𝜏2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
𝑁
𝑖=1     (7) 
 
Where N is the number of securities studied in the event window. The variance can be 
calculated as 
 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1, 𝜏2)) =
1
𝑁2
∑ 𝜎𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 (𝜏1, 𝜏2)   (8) 
 
I test if the abnormal returns are statistically different from zero during the event 
window using the test statistic 
 
𝜃1 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1,𝜏2)
√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1,𝜏2))
~ 𝑁(0,1)      (9) 
 
If the test statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns are equal to 
zero, I can observe what impact each event had on the daily returns.  
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An event is interpreted as being for the policy if CAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is significantly less than 0, and 
as against the policy if CAR̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  significantly more than 0, because firms regard disclosure 
requirements to be costly and should be better off if an event decreases the likelihood 
of increased disclosure requirements to be adopted.  
 
The methodology I use differs to some extent compared to the one used by Gao et al. 
(2016). In their study they calculate abnormal stock returns as the difference between 
the raw stock returns and the mean stock returns of a control group. Whereas I use the 
above presented methodology where the estimated parameters functions as a control 
group. 
 
Furthermore, this study only observes stock returns, in contrast to Gao et al. (2016) 
who also studies bond returns. The reason why they analyze bond returns in addition 
to stock returns is because their method to measure the effectiveness of reduced risk-
taking is by observing a move from investing in stock to investing in bonds. In 
addition to different fields of interest, I consider observing stock prices to be 
sufficient because most event study applications observe effects on one type of 
security (MacKinlay, 1997). Additionally the models presented in MacKinlay (1997) 
are for common equity and to use debt securities one has to modify the models. 
 
3.2 Robustness 
To check the robustness of the test I have reconstructed the test with an expanded 
event window to see if the chosen length impacts the results, as well as to look if run-
ups are present in the days prior the event date. I expand the event window to include 
40 trading days, resulting in 39-day event window with a -37, +1 design.  
4. Data  
4.1 Event dates 
This study examines the event of the Cardin-Lugar amendment, which is not bound to 
one specific date but has several dates that are of importance. The events are chosen 
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in accordance to the discussion in the methodology segment as an unanticipated event 
that reveals new information to the market.  
 
The legislative history of the Cardin-Lugar Amendment stretches from the fall of 
2006 and is still in progress since the final rule has yet to be adopted. Of its history I 
have identified seven important dates regarding Section 1504 and have narrowed it 
down to five event dates that will be assessed. An event has been left out if it has not 
met the requirements of an event date. The events have been identified through using 
the search functions on the webpages of the Wall Street Journal and the SEC using the 
search word “1504” (MacKinlay, 1997) as well using a list from Publish What You 
Pay (2015) that states the legislative history of Section 1504 until the rule was 
adopted in August 2012. A full list of identified dates is found in the appendix.  
 
The first time Section 1504 was included in the Dodd-Frank Act was on July 15, 
2010, when the final draft of the bill passed Congress and this is an event for the 
policy. I specify this as a valid event date because Section 1504 had previously not 
been included in the Bill and earlier versions of the Bill had failed to pass both the 
House and the Senate. I do not include the date when the President signed the Bill into 
law as no new information was provided and the signing was highly anticipated after 
passing Congress (Gao et al., 2016). 
 
The SEC proposed rules to implement Section 1504 on December 15, 2010, which I 
argue meets the requirements as the second event. The Dodd-Frank Act’s final impact 
is dependent on the regulation that follows of the regulatory authorities (Gao et al., 
2016). For Section 1504 it is the SEC that writes the final rules, thus all information 
regarding Section 1504 was still not available to the market. On August 22, 2012, The 
SEC adopted the rules however I do not include this event since no new information 
was provided. The proposal from the SEC is an event for the policy. 
 
The third event is when API et al. filed a lawsuit against the SEC on October 10, 
2012. This is the first event against the policy. The lawsuit was based on that the SEC 
had processed the rule proposal improperly and acted with bias by writing the rule 
without a thorough cost/benefit analysis. As mentioned before, the SEC was urged to 
not compromise with the pressuring industries and some expectations of resistance is 
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sound to assume. The lawsuit was however the first formal action against Section 
1504 and the time and scale of the event was unknown. Behind the lawsuit were many 
important parties backing the claims and the impact of the event is expected to be 
significant. 
 
API et al. won the case and the law was vacated on July 2
nd
, 2013, this event is 
specified as the fourth event and is against the policy. The outcome of a legal 
challenge is unknown until the court rules its final decision. The event of a final 
ruling was anticipated and the prices before this event should be reflect the markets’ 
cost/benefit expectation in combination of the likelihood of the lawsuit passing. Thus, 
the possible abnormal returns should reflect the differences in the expected outcome 
and the actual outcome.  
 
The final event in this study is when the SEC proposed a revised rule for Section 1504 
on December 11, 2015. It was known that the SEC would work with the comments of 
the final court decision and propose revised rules (Congressional Research Service, 
2015). Again, the final rules were not known, but in comparison to the first 
proposition in 2010 the probable scope is here argued to be greatly more predictable 
since a lot of information from the previous law could be anticipated to be the same. 
In contrary to the 2010 proposition, similar laws and directives had been implemented 
internationally before this proposition. I argue this to be in favor of the SEC to adopt 
the intended rules of the Dodd-Frank Act, thus, adopting firmer rules. Prior to this 
event, assumptions of the severity of the law will already be incorporated in the price, 
and price changes will be due to the outcome meeting or not meeting the markets’ 
expectation.  
4.2 Sample 
The examined firms are chosen through a selection criteria based on the legislative 
range of Section 1504. The section defines a resource extraction issuer as “an issuer 
that (i) is required to file an annual report with the Commission; and (ii) engages in 
the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals”, where commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals includes “exploration, extraction, 
processing, export, and other significant actions relating to oil, natural gas, or 
minerals, or the acquisition of a license for any such activity, as determined by the 
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Commission”.  
 
My sample includes companies listed on NASDAQ, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and NYSE MKT. The definition in Section 1504 could include a wide range 
of companies depending on how the Commission determines “other significant 
actions relation to oil, natural gas, or minerals”, and for practical reasons I have not 
reasoned what industries that might be, but instead focused on oil and natural gas 
producers, and mining companies according to Datastream. The sample from 
Datastream is gathered from equities in the United States from the categories Oil and 
Gas Producers, and Mining. The total number of oil and gas produces is 208, and 51 
for mining.  
 
Further I do not include companies which average daily trading volume, during the 
estimation window, does not exceed 100.000 (Bronstein, 2015). They are excluded in 
order to avoid the significant bias thinly traded stock can have on the results. Thinly 
traded stocks bias the variance estimate, by frequent zero-returns and extreme non-
zero returns (Cowan and Sergeant, 1996). Confounding events, such as earnings 
announcements overlapping the event window, also generates biased results by 
affecting stock prices and increasing the variance of stock returns (McWilliams And 
Siegel, 1997; Brown and Warner, 1985). Therefore, I use Datastream to gather firms’ 
earnings announcement dates and have excluded firms whose earnings announcement 
overlap with the event window. After narrowing down the sample the final number of 
firms studied is 74 to 108 oil and gas producers, and 13 to 19 mining companies, 
varying on the different event dates.  
 
MacKinlay (1997) discusses the use of small samples in event studies and 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) raise issues with using small samples. Small samples 
are generally a concern in statistics but MacKinlay (1997) argues that event studies 
generally have a high power even for small samples when the abnormal returns 
exceeds one percent, but does not raise limitations. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) 
argue that there are two issues with using small sample sizes in event studies. Firstly, 
the test statistic of an event study is based on the normality assumption that is 
associated with large samples (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). To address this issue 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) suggests that researchers should use bootstrap 
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methods that do not assume normality. This suggestion has not been used in this study 
because of time restriction. Secondly, the test statistic is sensitive to outliers 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) because the estimated parameters are based on OLS 
regressions, which are highly sensitive to outliers. Small samples are especially 
exposed because the impact of one firm’s returns impacts the sample statistic in a 
higher degree. I do not control for outliers by deleting them, because I do not want to 
further decrease the sample size. A more extensive study can use a nonparametric test 
to control for potential outliers without compromising the sample size.  
5. Results 
The results are first presented with an overall discussion followed by an analysis for 
each event separately. Table 1 presents the empirical results of the study. In addition 
to the three-day event window I do a robustness check by reconstructing the test with 
a 39-day event window. The results of the robustness check are presented in Table 3. 
Descriptive statistics of the tests are presented in Table 2 and Table 4 respectively, 
and figures for the robustness check are presented in the appendix. 
 
Table 1. Extractive Industries’ Stock Market Reaction on Events Surrounding the Passage of the 
Cardin-Lugar Amendment with a 3-day event window. 
Event Date Event For or Against 
the Policy 
Oil and Natural 
Gas Producers 
Mining 
Companies 
N 𝐂𝐀𝐑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  N 𝐂𝐀𝐑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
15-Jul-10 The Dodd-Frank Act 
Passes Congress 
For 74 -0.059 
(0.448) 
13 0.330 
(0.425) 
15-Dec-10 The SEC Proposes Rules 
for Section 1504 
For 75 -1.851*** 
(0.000) 
18 -5.829*** 
(0.000) 
10-Oct-12 API et al. Files a Lawsuit 
Against the SEC 
Against 93 3.026*** 
(0.000) 
19 1.700* 
(0.089) 
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02-Jul-13 Section 1504 is Vacated Against 98 -1.101*** 
(0.003) 
19 0.287 
(0.401) 
11-Dec-15 The SEC Proposes 
Revised Rules for Section 
1504 
For 108 -5.446*** 
(0.000) 
18 -3.109* 
(0.056) 
Data collected from Datastream and calculated using the market model method with a three-day 
event window and S&P 500 as market index, a two-sided test with p<0.01***, p<0.05**, p<0.1*, 
p-value in parenthesis, and N = Number of firms in event.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Events Surrounding the 
Passage of the Cardin-Lugar Amendment with a 3-day event window. 
Event Median Standard 
Deviation 
Spread 
Oil and Gas Mining Oil and 
Gas 
Mining Oil and 
Gas 
Mining 
The Dodd-Frank Act Passes 
Congress 
0.11 -0.74 0.45 1.74 15.52 10.31 
The SEC Proposes Rules for Section 
1504 
-1.00 -5.33 0.44 1.42 22.47 12.49 
API et al. Files a Lawsuit Against 
the SEC 
3.17 1.45 0.43 1.25 23.8 23.24 
Section 1504 is Vacated 0.18 -0.74 0.40 1.14 49.18 19.09 
The SEC Proposes Revised Rules 
for Section 1504 
-4.42 -3.20 1.01 1.95 56.7 22.94 
The table presents median values to add to the mean values (𝐂𝐀𝐑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) presented in Table 1. Spread 
is calculated as the maximum CAR subtracted with the minimum CAR of the samples.    
 
The first inference to be drawn from Table 1 is that there is a significant difference 
between the studied industries. The oil and gas industries show significant abnormal 
returns in four out of five events, whereas for the mining industry only one out of the 
five events has a test statistic that lies outside the critical region of the test (𝜃α/2 = ± 
1.96 for α=5%).  The evidence suggests that the mining industry is unaffected by the 
passing of the Cardin-Lugar Amendment, with one exception. Furthermore, the 
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hypothesis is supported for four of the events that have significant abnormal returns. 
The only exception is that oil and gas industries show abnormal returns in the 
opposite direction of the hypothesis when the court vacates Section 1504.  
 
The first event was the only event of the five studied where the null hypotheses could 
not be rejected for either of the industries. I expected this event to result in negative 
cumulative abnormal returns over the event window. The lack of abnormal returns 
could most likely be explained by that the market already expected this event to occur 
because it has been on the political agenda for a long time, as regulations usually are. 
That means that the prices already account for increased disclosure requirements and 
that the inclusion of Section 1504 came as no surprise. The results from Table 3 show 
no statistically significant presence of a run up prior the event date, which gives us 
further belief that the prices already incorporate an introduction of the Cardin-Lugar 
Amendment. This indicates that the event date is misspecified because the effect of 
the supposed event had already happened. As mentioned earlier the final impact of the 
Dodd-Frank Act depends on subsequent regulatory authorities, such as the SEC. 
Another possible explanation could be that the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act might 
not be particularly important to investors; instead greater focus is on the proposed 
rules by the SEC. I would argue, however, that is it unlikely that the market is 
unaffected by the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and that the former explanation is 
more probable. In addition to Section 1504 this was also the first time Section 1503 
Reporting requirements regarding coal or other mine safety was included in the 
Dodd-Frank Act (The Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). Section 1503 require mining 
companies to include information about mine safety in their annual reports and 
implies extra costs for the companies but does not reduce business opportunities in the 
same way that Section 1504 does, and the market’s reaction is expected to be negative 
but modest. However, as the evidence show this did not affect the mining industry 
significantly. 
 
In line with the hypothesis the second event shows significant negative cumulative 
abnormal returns for both industries. When the Dodd-Frank Act was signed in to law 
it stated that the SEC would propose its rules for Section 1504 within 270 days 
resulting in this event being partially anticipated (The Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). As 
earlier discussed however, the Dodd-Frank Act is highly dependent on the subsequent 
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regulatory authorities and thus the magnitude of the proposed rule was unknown. The 
results follow the expected pattern but there is a great difference in reaction between 
the two industries, with the mining industry experiencing far greater negative 
abnormal returns. During this event there are two important confounding events for 
mining companies to take in consideration when analyzing the results. In addition the 
Section 1504, the Dodd-Frank Act also includes Section 1502 Conflict minerals that 
further impacts the mining companies (The Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). Section 1502 
requires issuers to disclose if any conflict minerals necessary to the functionality or 
production of a product originate from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an 
adjoining country. The section restricts issuers’ availability to conduct business and 
market reactions are expected to follow that of Section 1504. On this event date the 
SEC proposed rules for section 1502, 1503, and 1504 (SEC, 2013), all affecting the 
mining industry and the mining companies show large negative abnormal returns 
accordingly and the effect cannot be exclusively explained by Section 1504. This 
event date is the only one where the all three sections overlap in terms of correct 
specification of an event.  
 
The empirical results for the third event are in line with the third hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis can however only be rejected for the oil and gas industry because the test 
statistic for the mining industry is below the critical region. The positive response to 
the lawsuit can be explained by that the markets expected the lawsuit to be likely to 
come through fully or partially, so that costs associated with Section 1504 would be 
avoided. The plaintiffs challenged the SEC on several claims and consisted of large 
players from both the oil and the trade industries (Congressional Research Service, 
2015). This fact strengthens the lawsuit to have credibility and the markets’ reaction 
is reasonable. An explanation why only the oil and gas industry experience significant 
positive cumulative abnormal returns is that the lawsuit was pushed by two large oil 
industry organizations. 
 
When API et al. wins in court against the SEC, the oil and gas industry surprisingly 
experience negative cumulative abnormal returns. The lawsuit was pushed by the oil 
industry and by winning in court positive abnormal returns were expected, especially 
for the oil industry. Even if the negative abnormal returns are not of great magnitude 
the results are surprising. A possible explanation is that the even if the court vacated 
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the rule, the court did not meet all of the challenging claims made by the API et al. 
Instead, the court vacated the rule based on two errors made by the SEC, namely, that 
they misread the amendment from the Dodd-Frank Act that the information was to be 
publicly available and that they did not allow exemptions to be made for countries 
that do not allow payment disclosures. The SEC decided did not appeal the court’s 
decision but instead stated that they would work on a new rule that met the objections 
made by the court. The outcome of the court decision was arguably less severe than 
the market expected and the expected gain incorporated in the stock price prior the 
event was too high.  
 
The new proposal of the SEC results in great negative cumulative abnormal returns 
for the oil and gas industry. Following the arguments made for the second event, this 
event was partially anticipated of the market but was unknown in terms of exactly 
when the revised rules where to be announced and the magnitude of the rules. The 
results give us an indication that the rule was more severe than the market had 
expected. The new rules allow exemptions to be made, judged by the Commission on 
a case-to-case basis. However, the rule still requires the issuers to publicly disclose 
the information, a point that in 2013 led to the adopted rules being vacated (SEC, 
2015). The information available to the public prior the event was that the SEC would 
meet the objections of the court, and keeping this requirement of public availability 
comes as a shock. Numerous commenters supported the requirement of public 
availability, which served as support for the choice to keep the requirement (SEC, 
2015). A more drastic reaction was indeed expected, following the assumption that 
the likelihood of passage increases after each event. In contrast to the second event 
where the SEC presented the first proposed rules, the oil and gas industry experience 
greater cumulative abnormal returns than the mining industry. This enforces the 
argumentation of the second event that the mining industry experiences greater 
abnormal returns as a result of the confounding events.  
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5.1 Robustness 
 
Table 3. Extractive Industries’ Stock Market Reaction on Events Surrounding the Passage of the 
Cardin-Lugar Amendment with a 39-day event window. 
Event Date Event For or Against 
the Policy 
Oil and Natural 
Gas Producers 
Mining 
Companies 
N 𝐂𝐀𝐑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  N 𝐂𝐀𝐑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
15-Jul-10 The Dodd-Frank Act 
Passes Congress 
For 73 1.694 
(0.195) 
13 -3.481 
(0.302) 
15-Dec-10 The SEC Proposes Rules 
for Section 1504 
For 74 5.404 
(0.100) 
17 12.694*** 
(0.004) 
10-Oct-12 API et al. Files a Lawsuit 
Against the SEC 
Against 91 6.402*** 
(0.000) 
18 14.505*** 
(0.000) 
02-Jul-13 Section 1504 is Vacated Against 98 1.748 
(0.106) 
19 -2.206 
(0.291) 
11-Dec-15 The SEC Proposes 
Revised Rules for Section 
1504 
For 107 -24.901*** 
(0.000) 
17 -17.291*** 
(0.003) 
Data collected from Datastream and calculated using the market model method with a 39-day 
event window and S&P 500 as market index, a two-sided test with p<0.01***, p<0.05**, p<0.1*, 
p-value in parenthesis, and N = Number of firms in event.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Events Surrounding the 
Passage of the Cardin-Lugar Amendment with a 39-day event window. 
Event Median Standard 
Deviation 
Spread 
Oil and Gas Mining Oil and 
Gas 
Mining Oil and 
Gas 
Mining 
The Dodd-Frank Act Passes 
Congress 
1.74 -0.31 1.98 6.67 69.23 56.75 
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The SEC Proposes Rules for 
Section 1504 
6.17 11.29 4.22 4.87 225.06 86.92 
API et al. Files a Lawsuit Against 
the SEC 
6.48 15.46 1.62 4.42 75.95 68.54 
Section 1504 is Vacated 2.85 -4.22 1.39 3.98 114.72 52.34 
The SEC Proposes Revised Rules 
for Section 1504 
-19.92 -15.77 3.34 6.36 184.22 130.06 
The table presents median values to add to the mean values (𝐂𝐀𝐑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) presented in Table 3. Spread 
is calculated as the maximum CAR subtracted with the minimum CAR of the samples. 
 
The choice of event window length does seem to matter in some cases. For the oil and 
gas industry the second and fourth events lose their significance. For the mining 
industry the second event has opposite value with high positive abnormal returns and 
the third event now shows significant positive abnormal returns. Recalling the 
arguments of the costs of expanding the event window presented in the methodology 
segment it is not surprising that the results differ to some extent. 
 
The second event of the robustness check show opposite direction of the abnormal 
returns opposed to the results in Table 1. The results suggest that the mining industry 
experience a run-up period over an expanded event window. This indicates that the 
market changed its expectations over time that the proposing rules would less costly 
than previously thought, or that they increasingly thought the rule to be unlikely to 
pass. 
 
The third event shows interesting results where a run-up period in the expanded event 
window is present, for the mining industry cumulating positive abnormal returns to 
14.5 percent. The lawsuit is considered to be clearly unanticipated and no run-up 
effect is expected to be present. A possible explanation for this is that the SEC 
adopted their final rules for both 1502 and 1504 on August 22, 2012 (The SEC, 
2013), 49 days prior the event date (τ = -35), and that the market expected the 
industries to challenge the SEC. 
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Lastly, the fifth event shows surprisingly large negative cumulative abnormal returns. 
This suggests that the market adjusted its expectation of the cost of the coming rule 
proposal to be increasingly costly than previously thought. 
 
One consequence of increasing the length of event windows is that more confounding 
events are likely to be present. In the robustness check, confounding events have not 
been controlled for and that will bias the results.  
6. Discussion 
This study contributes to a relatively unexplored field of literature and adds important 
knowledge for future research and policymaking. The contributions are narrow as the 
observed events are restricted to the U.S. markets and no global conclusion can be 
drawn. I do however add one more block of understanding the dynamics of disclosure 
requirements and firm value. The results of this study rely on rather strong 
assumptions for the methodology and the explanations of the abnormal returns have 
not been tested empirically, but been discussed from a theoretical perspective. For the 
sake of transparency, opportunities to improve the study, and for future research, I 
present some limitations of the study below.  
 
The results of the study show the presence or absence of correlations between an 
event and changes in firm value, but they do not infer information about causality. 
The causing effects presented in the literature segment are not proven to be 
collectively exhaustive for explaining the why the results occur. McWilliams and 
Siegel (1997) argue that as a second stage of an analysis the researcher should regress 
the abnormal returns against a measure of a given theoretical explanation. This 
requires a more extensive study as more specific data is to observe a potential proxy 
for a theoretical explanation. For this study, an example could be to regress the 
abnormal returns against the number of countries a firm operates in as a proxy for the 
cost of compliance, assuming it costs more to acquire all necessary data when a firm 
operates in more countries.  
 
The presented discussions from Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) and Berns (2011) do 
have one important limitation for this study to address. The increased costs that 
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follow the implementation of disclosure requirements/Section 1504 are discussed 
from the firms’ point of view, which do not necessarily represent the view of the 
market. The literature only presents one effect between firms and the market, which is 
that increased information asymmetry between firms and investors decrease firm 
value. Stock prices are assumed to be valued as the discounted value of all future cash 
flows (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), and an increase in a firm’s costs results in a 
decrease in future cash flows. Thus, the interests of the firm and investors are aligned. 
It is however sound to assume that the market and firms to some extent have 
differences in what is considered as value adding activities, that are not raised in the 
literature used in this study.  
 
Furthermore, the presented causing effects are not weighted or discussed for their 
possible explanatory power of explaining the results. Instead, they are collectively 
used to explain a direction of an event. This is however a difficult task, for example, 
according to Johannesen and Larsen (2016) the estimated costs added for reporting 
the required information is around $0.3 million per firm. This number differs greatly 
from ExxonMobil’s estimations that state that the cost of compliance of the proposed 
rules will exceed $50 million (Berns, 2011). Estimates can be assumed to be biased 
from the affected industry, however, for companies such as Shell that operates in over 
90 countries, designing a system to account payments on project basis will require 
large amount of resources (Berns, 2011).  
 
Another possible explanation discussed by Johannesen and Larsen (2016) and 
Shaxson (2007) is that disclosing payments made to government hinders the 
possibility for firms to use tax havens. Johannesen and Larsen (2016) focus only on 
tax payments and fail to recognize that “payments” includes more types of payments, 
for example license fees, production entitlements and payments for infrastructure 
improvements. I expand the possible explanations, but I do not take tax evasion in 
consideration. This study has the assumption that corruption mainly is a systemic 
matter and that the main issue is in the governments of the resource rich countries in 
line with Shaxson (2007). That assumption has however biased this study to assume 
that corporations do not push corruption or acts unethically by purpose, by using tax 
havens for example.  
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This study does not consider a possibly gain of presenting a good image by taking 
social responsibility and working towards transparency. Observing stock price effects 
alone does not give us enough information to evaluate if socially responsible behavior 
positively or negatively affects economic performance (McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997). However, this could be an important aspect to consider. For example, Statoil 
did not support the lawsuit by API et al. but instead became one of the first major oil 
company to voluntarily disclose it payments to governments (Statoil, 2014). This 
gives us reason to believe that some firms find value in voluntarily disclose 
information. 
 
A reason why the event study methodology dominates in the empirical research of 
corporate finance is because it is easy to conduct and results in direct wealth effects. 
The simplicity of the methodology does for this study come with a cost. The method 
only observes how the markets of the chosen industries react as a whole and does not 
consider the how exposed different firms are to the legislation. A more representative 
method would weigh the differences of exposure. For example, a firm that only 
operate in the U.S. will not be affected by Section 1504 to the same extent as a firm 
that only operates in countries such as Nigeria and Angola. However, that would need 
additional data sets that show to what extent the different firms operate in countries 
where corruption is present.  
7. Conclusion 
The evidence from this study suggests that the markets of U.S. listed oil and gas 
producers seem to react negatively in terms of firm value as a consequence of the 
passing of the Cardin-Lugar Amendment, suggesting increased disclosure 
requirements result in a reduction of wealth. The markets show no significant 
response for the mining industry regardless the nature of the event, with only one 
exception that overlaps with two important confounding events. The absence of 
abnormal returns suggests that the mining industry is unaffected by increased 
disclosure requirements. These findings in combination with the findings of 
Johannesen and Larsen (2016) stress the importance of knowing the full effect of 
foreign disclosure requirements as a measure to mitigate corruption in resource rich 
countries.  
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The evidence suggests that implementing disclosure requirements for extractive firms 
harms the implementing county/economic region. Thus, the empirical knowledge so 
far shows a net negative effect of the regulations. In order for the regulations to be 
successful, the corruption in the resource rich countries has to decrease to account for 
the decrease of economic value in stock markets.  
8. Future Research 
The final effect of the Cardin-Lugar Amendment is still to be examined since the final 
rule has yet to be adopted by the SEC. When the final rule is adopted and reaches its 
effective date, some of the presented theoretical discussions can be studied 
empirically. I invite future research to be conducted in order to study if affected 
companies retract from countries where corruption is present, and if foreign 
companies delist from the U.S. stock markets, as a result of Section 1504. Evidence 
regarding these questions provides valuable knowledge of the effectiveness of the 
intent of the Cardin-Lugar Amendment. That is, if corruption in resource rich 
countries will be mitigated or if the rule forces U.S. listed firms out of these countries 
only to be replaced by unregulated firms. 
 
Furthermore, the existing research on this subject observes and presents empirical 
evidence for two local economic regions. To draw conclusions of how extractive 
firms react to disclosure requirements in general, research have to be done in all more 
where legislation as the Cardin-Lugar Amendment has been implemented. Possible 
future research can be conducted on the events of increased disclosure requirements 
in Norway, United Kingdom, Canada, and Hong Kong Stock Exchange.   
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Appendix A: Legislative History  
 
Table 5. Full legislative history of the Cardin-Lugar Amendment. 
* Event classified as an event date according to MacKinlay (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event 
For or against 
legislation 
Event date 
Various congress work regarding transparency of the 
extractive industry 
FOR 2006 < 
Introduction of the Energy Security Through Transparency 
Act 
FOR 23-09-2009 
The Dodd-Frank Act including Section 1504 passed 
Congress* 
FOR 15-07-2010 
The President signs the Dodd-Frank Act into federal law FOR 21-07-2010 
SEC proposes rules for Section 1504* FOR 15-12-2010 
SEC adopted the rules for Section 1504 FOR 22-08-2012 
API files a lawsuit against the SEC for Section 1504* AGAINST 25-10-2012 
The US Court vacates SEC’s rule for Section 1504* AGAINST 02-07-2013 
SEC proposes a revised version of Section 1504* FOR 11-12-2015 
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Appendix B: Company Tickers 
 
Table 6. List of company tickers used in the study. 
Oil and Gas Tickers 
    
Mining 
Tickers 
@AREX(P) U:APA(P) U:ENBL(P) U:OAS(P) U:TRGP(P) 
 
@ARLP(P) 
@AXAS(P) U:APC(P) U:EOG(P) U:OXY(P) U:TSO(P) 
 
@CETC(P) 
@BBEP(P) U:AR(P) U:EPE(P) U:PARR(P) U:UPL(P) 
 
@HNRG(P) 
@CRZO(P) U:ARP(P) U:EQT(P) U:PBF(P) U:WES(P) 
 
@RGLD(P) 
@EVEP(P) U:BBG(P) U:ERN(P) U:PBT(P) U:WGP(P) 
 
@WLB(P) 
@FANG(P) U:BCEI(P) U:ESTE(P) U:PE(P) U:WLL(P) 
 
29557Q(P) 
@GPOR(P) U:BPT(P) U:GLP(P) U:PER(P) U:VLO(P) 
 
U:AMCO(P) 
@LGCY(P) U:BSM(P) U:GTE(P) U:PHX(P) U:WNR(P) 
 
U:AUMN(P) 
@LINE(P) U:CHK(P) U:HES(P) U:PQ(P) U:WPX(P) 
 
U:BTU(P) 
@LLEX(P) U:CHKR(P) U:HFC(P) U:PSX(P) U:WTI(P) 
 
U:CDE(P) 
@LNCO(P) U:CIE(P) U:HGT(P) U:PXD(P) U:XCO(P) 
 
U:CLD(P) 
@MEMP(P) U:CLR(P) U:HK(P) U:QEP(P) U:XEC(P) 
 
U:CMP(P) 
@MRD(P) U:COG(P) U:HNR(P) U:REN(P) U:XOM(P) 
 
U:CNX(P) 
@PDCE(P) U:COP(P) U:HUSA(P) U:RICE(P) 
  
U:FELP(P) 
@REXX(P) U:CPE(P) U:KOS(P) U:RMP(P) 
  
U:GMO(P) 
@RXDX(P) U:CRC(P) U:LNG(P) U:ROYT(P) 
  
U:GORO(P) 
@TRCH(P) U:CRK(P) U:LPI(P) U:RRC(P) 
  
U:HCLP(P) 
@USEG(P) U:CWEI(P) U:MCF(P) U:SBR(P) 
  
U:HL(P) 
@VNR(P) U:CVI(P) U:MEP(P) U:SDR(P) 
  
U:LODE(P) 
@WRES(P) U:CVRR(P) U:MPC(P) U:SDT(P) 
  
U:MGN(P) 
@ZN(P) U:CVX(P) U:MRO(P) U:SGY(P) 
  
U:MUX(P) 
30927H(P) U:CXO(P) U:MTDR(P) U:SJT(P) 
  
U:NEM(P) 
32232W(P) U:DK(P) U:MUR(P) U:SM(P) 
  
U:NRP(P) 
32803D(P) U:DNR(P) U:MVO(P) U:SN(P) 
  
U:SLCA(P) 
410114(P) U:DVN(P) U:NBL(P) U:SWN(P) 
  
U:SWC(P) 
77113C(P) U:ECR(P) U:NDRO(P) U:SYRG(P) 
  
U:SXC(P) 
875762(P) U:ECT(P) U:NFX(P) U:TEP(P) 
  
U:SXCP(P) 
U:ALDW(P) U:EGN(P) U:NOG(P) U:TPL(P) 
  
U:UAMY(P) 
U:ALJ(P) U:EGY(P) U:NTI(P) U:TPLM(P) 
  
U:XPL(P) 
Tickers are gathered from Datastream. 
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Appendix C: Figures to Robustness Test 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns when the Dodd-Frank Act Passes Congress with a 39-
day event window. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns when SEC Proposes Rules for Section 1504 with a 39-
day event window. 
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Figure 4. Cumulative Abnormal Returns when API et al. Files a Lawsuit Against the SEC with a 
39-day event window. 
 
 
Figure 5. Cumulative Abnormal Returns when Section 1504 is Vacated with a 39-day event 
window. 
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Figure 6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns when the SEC Proposes Revised Rules for Section 1504 
with a 39-day event window. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
